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  Children, Support in Old Age and Social Insurance in Rural China 
Zhang Chuanchuan*
Abstract: Most people in rural China have no plans for retirement other than the ingrained 
Chinese tradition that children care for old parents. Actually there are also no sources of  social support 
such as social old-age insurance to rely on in rural people’ old age for a long time in China. In 1992, a 
social old-age insurance program, rural pension program, was initiated by the Chinese government to 
firstly establish a social security system in China’s rural area. The rural pension program experienced 
rapid development in the beginning years but grounded to halt after 1998. Since either children or 
pension program provides support for elderly, we expected that these two can be viewed as substitutes 
to some extent. Using data from China’s 2005 mini-census, we find that rural people who have at least 
one son are less likely to participate in pension program and each additional son and daughter both 
decreases their participation rate. Moreover, the effect of  an additional son is much larger than that of  
an additional daughter. In addition, both evidence from mini-census and China Health and Retirement 
Longitudinal Study show that peasants accessing to pension are less likely to rely on their children for 
support in old age. These findings suggest that demand for children, especially for sons are partly 
driven by concerns relating to care in old age; children and formal social old-age insurance are 
substitutes for support in old age. We then expect that implementation of  social old-age insurance may 
mitigate rural people’ demand for children, especially sons and thus correct China’s severe sex ratio bias 
to some extent. We test this hypothesis using the difference-in-differences strategy, and find that 
increase of  sex ratio at the region level slowed down after the implementation of  the rural pension 
program. Overall, our empirical analysis in this paper implies that sex ratio bias is partly due to 
demanding for sons for support in old age and carrying out social old-age insurance in rural China are 
helpful in mitigating demand for children and correcting sex ratio bias.  
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 1. Introduction 
In China, especially in rural area, raising children for old age support is an ingrained tradition for a 
long time. This tradition has somewhat changed in urban area as the development of  social insurance 
system. For rural people, who almost have no social insurance to rely on until recently, still have to rely 
on their adult children for support in old age (Shi, 2006). According to China’s 2005 mini-census, about 
70.64% of  the elderly aged 65 and above are mainly supported by their family members. One more thing, 
sons rather than daughters are traditionally expected to take care of  parents in old age. This is usually 
attributed to China’s traditional patrilineal family system and patrilocal culture. Although these traditions 
have changed to some extent in urban area, they are still quite prevalent in rural area. Under this 
traditional culture, parents call in a daughter-in-law for each of  their sons, and after marriage sons are 
entitled to co-reside with their parents until family division occurs or until both of  their parents pass 
away; family property is also usually inherited by sons, and sons are obliged to take care of  their old age 
parents (Li et al, 2004). The fact that adult children, especially adult sons serve as providers of  support 
in old age resulted in high fertility rate and son preference in China’s rural area. Patterns of  births 
indicate that parents seldom stop giving birth until they have at least one son (Zeng, et al. 1993; 
Ebenstein, 2010).  
In order to promote modernization by slowing the rapid growth of  China’s population, the Chinese 
government initiated a population control campaign in 1970 which advocates one family to have no 
more than two children. Thereafter the voluntary family planning became a strictly enforced family 
planning policy in 1979, i.e. one family is only permitted to have one child. In rural area, where farmers’ 
overwhelming desire for sons who can serve as labor sources and sources of  support in old age has 
made the one-child policy difficult to enforce. Consequently, the government relaxed the one-child 
policy in 1984 to “1.5 child policy” in most of  rural areas. Parents whose first child is female are allowed 
to give a second birth; otherwise, only one child is allowed (Zeng, 2007). Despite nationwide resistance 
from rural families, the Chinese government had succeeded in reducing population size. China’s total 
fertility rate decreases from six births per woman in 1970 to two births per woman in 1980 and further 
to 1.5 births in 2007. One unanticipated consequence of  the family planning policy was a rapid rise of  
 sex-ratio at birth (Ebenstein, 2010; Li Hongbin et al 2010).1
Figure 1 
 The rural people, who want to have a son 
but are not allowed to have more than two children, try their best to give birth a son at the first parity 
through prenatal selection or abortion. Sex ratio at birth increased from 108.47 in 1981 to 120.56 in 
2008 (see Figure 1). High sex ratio bias implies a large number of  men would fail to find a spouse, which 
may cause violent crime and other socioeconomic problems (Ebenstein and Jennings, 2008; Edlund et al., 
2010) .  
It was hypothesized that given the strict family planning policy, the fact that sons rather than 
daughters serve as providers of  support in old age and lacking of  old-age insurance are main reasons of  
the higher sex ratio at birth in rural China (Zeng, 2005). Using data from China Household Income 
Survey, Ebenstein and Leung (2010) firstly show that an important motivation for having a son is to 
secure a viable source of  support in old age and female deficit is related to a missing market for social 
insurance. On the basis of  their study, using a new large dataset, this paper examines how the presence 
of  sons or daughters affects the pension enrollment decisions of  the rural people, how accessing to 
pension program affects their choices of  support in old age and how accessing to social old-age 
insurance affect rural people’s fertility behavior. In all, we try to find out whether sons and social old-age 
insurance are substitutes and thus carrying out social old-age insurance can mitigate demand for sons 
and thereafter correct sex ratio bias. Our paper shares the same research purpose with Ebenstein and 
Leung (2010) that it studies the relationship between absence of  sons and pension enrollment decision 
and examines the impact of  availability of  pension on sex ratio. However, Ebenstein and Leung (2010) 
use a much smaller dataset than us, which only cover about one hundred counties. And, partly due to the 
limitation of  the dataset, its estimation results suffer from several problems: first, when examining the 
impact of  no sons on pension participation, its setup fails to control total number of  children2
                                                      
1 Sex ratio is defined as the number of  male per 100 female.   
 and 
region fixed effect, which probably overestimate the impact of  sons; second, since the households in its 
sample has not yet finished childbearing history, there may be severe reverse effect considering the 
2 It is impossible to calculate the total number of  children in CHIS data since only children living with parents are surveyed. 
 impact of  the pension program on fertility behavior established in the second part of  the paper; third, 
the sex ratio of  the birth cohorts from 1991 to 2000 is not appropriate for serving as the post-program 
sex ratio under the difference-in-differences framework, since the program is still under development 
during 1991 to 2000, it is clearly that the development of  the program between 1991 and 2000 would be 
affected by the fertility pattern during this period. Under the difference-in-differences framework, the 
post-program sex ratio should be calculated using the birth cohorts after 1998, in which year the 
program stops to receive new participants; finally, limited by the dataset, only sex ratios in 95 regions 
have been examined, which may could not reflect the nationwide situation. In this paper, we use data 
from China’s 2005 mini-census, the largest dataset that qualified for the purpose of  our study. We restrict 
our sample to parents who have finished their childbearing history in estimating the impact of  number 
of  sons and daughters on parents’ enrollment decisions in an attempt to avoid the reverse effect and also 
add region dummies to eliminate the unobservable relevant factors. We find impact similar to Ebenstein 
and Leung (2010), but with a much smaller magnitude, especially after controlling for region fixed effects. 
We also find parents who had pension benefits are less likely to rely on their family members for support. 
These findings do suggest that demand for children, especially sons, is driven by concerns relating to 
care in old age. Using data from a newly conducted household survey, China Health and Retirement 
Longitudinal Study (CHARLS), we estimate the impact of  accessing to social old-age insurance on 
peasants’ choice of  support in old age. We find people accessing to social old-age insurance are 
significantly less like to choose children as providers of  support in old age. This result re-confirms our 
evidence from mini-census data. Finally, we examine the impact of  implementation of  pension program 
on sex ratio at the region level. We employ the standard difference-in-differences (DID) strategy. Sex 
ratio of  birth cohorts from 1999 to 2005 is used as post-program sex ratio at birth, while sex ratio of  
birth cohorts from 1985 to 1991 is used as before-program sex ratio at birth. We also take into account 
of  the different mortality rates between male and female across ages by calculating the 
mortality-adjusted sex ratio. The identification assumption for the validity of  our DID strategy is 
formally tested. Our empirical results suggest that carrying out pension program in rural China 
significantly mitigated sex ratio. Our more convincing estimation results confirm the conclusion of  
Ebenstein and Leung (2010) that carrying out pension program mitigated the increase in sex ratio at 
 birth, however, with a much smaller magnitude. 
The rest of  the paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 briefly introduces the pension program 
carried out in rural China. Section 3 describes the datasets we are using. Section 4 provides empirical 
results. In section 5, we conclude.   
2. Pension Programs in China’s Rural Area 
In China’s rural area, the traditional old-age support system is based on collective system and family 
before 1978 and singly based on family after the introduction of  the Household Responsibility System in 
1978. Before 1978, most farmers receive basic guarantees provided by the collectives, such as 
employment and income and old age security; after 1978, when people totally lose the ability to work, 
they are taken care of  by their own family members, mainly their adult children (Wang, 2006). In early 
1980s, the Chinese government tried establishing social security system in urban area. The milestone of  
this trial is the promulgation of  “Decision on endowment insurance reform of  enterprise workers” in 1991, which 
marks the establishment of  urban basic endowment insurance system. The government’s endeavor to 
establish social security system is synchronous in urban and rural area. Also in 1991, the Chinese 
government carried out pilot projects for establishing an old-age social insurance system in rural area, 
and then formally promulgated “Basic Program of  Rural Old-age Pension at region level (Trial)”  (Ministry of  
Civil Affairs, 1992) as regulations in the next year. The rural old-age pension program was initiated under 
the supervision of  the Ministry of  Civil Affairs and is funded by individual contributions with 
supplemental collective-sponsored contributions and governmental policy support (Wang, 2006). By the 
end of  1992, the Ministry had expanded the program to over 1000 regions, thereafter throughout China 
(Leisering et al, 2002). According to the document “Basic Program of  Rural Old-age Pension at region level 
(Trial)” (Ministry of  Civil Affairs, 1992), all rural residents aged 20-60 years were eligible to participate in 
the pension program and promised to receive pension benefits once they turn 60 years old.  
Figure 2 
The rural pension program was highly popular among peasants and experienced rapid expansion 
 since 1992. It was estimated that more than 75.42 million farmers had underwritten the insurance 
scheme by the end of  1997. Figure 2 depicts the development of  the program from 1995 to 2007. It is 
shown that despite the initial success of  the rural pension program during the early 1990s the 
development of  program ground to halt after 1998. Poor management, intimidating recruitment tactics 
and embezzlement and suspicions related to the financial sustainability of  the promised returns mitigate 
support from the central government (Zeng, 1995; Shi, 2006; Wang, 2006). The work of  rural old-age 
pension program was transferred from the Ministry of  Civil Affairs to the Ministry of  Labor and Social 
Security3 in 1998. Political conflict eroded internal support for the program, and the Asian financial 
crisis also provided the impetus for a fundamental change in policy orientation (Shi, 2006). The State 
Council acclaimed to rectify the existing business and to stop accepting new business in 1999. The 
percentage of  farmers insured sharply declined in the following years, falling from 15.4 percent in 1997 
to 11.0 percent in 2004 (Wang, 2006). Regions participating in this rural pension program decreased 
from 2100 in 1999 to 1887 in 2004 (Zeng, 2005). It is estimated that the participation rate is less than 3% 
by the end of  20054
It is a pity that the first trial of  establishing social old-age insurance system in China’s rural area 
ends in failure. After about ten years of  the stagnation of  the rural old-age pension program, the 
Chinese government restarts to carry out social old-age insurance in China in 2009, which is now named 
as new rural old-age pension program (NRPP). NRPP has been developing rapidly since the 
implementation. By the end of  2010, there was a coverage rate of  24%. In the work discussion meeting 
on rural social insurance held in Dec. 2011, the vice Minister Hu Xiaoyi said NRPP would cover all rural 
areas by the end of  2012, eight years earlier than originally planned.  
.  
3. Data  
This is the main dataset we are using in this paper, and is also the largest individual-level dataset 
qualified for our research purpose. The mini-census consists of  basic demographic information for 
China’s 2005 mini-census 
                                                      
3 Now it is named Ministry of  Human Resources and Social Security (MOHRSS). 
4 Data come from China agricultural statistics yearbook, 2005. 
 individual respondents and also contains information regarding respondents’ participation in social 
insurance (including pension and health insurance), work status and source of  old-age support. For 
female respondents aged from 16 to 64, we also have their fertility information. 
Figure 3 
Individual-level data are employed to examine the effects of  number and sex composition of  
children on parents’ pension enrollment decision. Subjects are restricted to household head and spouse 
of  household head, and further restricted to female aged from 50 to 64 and male whose spouse aged 
from 50 to 64. In the 2005 mini-census, women aged 65 or above have not been asked about 
information on fertility, thus have no information on number of  children. Restricted to female aged 
above 50 and male whose spouse aged above 50 are for two concerns: first, people in this group are 
more likely to participate in the social insurance and thus they are the people we are concerning (see 
Figure 3); second, more importantly, restricting to female who are at least 50 year old could do us a favor 
in avoiding two-way effect in our econometric analysis, which will be discussed in detail later. We further 
classify observations by their types of  work unit and restrict our sample to those who are self-employed 
(operators of  land contract and those work individual business), work in other types of  enterprises or 
not at work5. People who work in governments and institutions or formal enterprises are often 
mandated to participate in social insurance or enroll other types of  insurance, and therefore have high 
participation rates (see Table A1). Since we focus on individuals’ voluntary enrollment decision, we 
exclude those subjects whose enrollments are probably mandatory. Also, we want to assure that the 
pension program enrolled by rural people is the rural pension program initiated in 1992. The timing of  
this pension program is exploited in estimating the impact of  accessing to pension on sex ratio with a 
difference-in-differences identification strategy. It is worth to mention that whether the pension program 
enrolled by rural people is the rural pension program or not does not matter for estimating the impact 
of  children on enrollment decisions. Finally, we are left with 181080 observations6
                                                      
5 See Table A1 in the Appendix for classification of  types of  work unit. We use the same classification of  China’s 2005 mini-census. 
. Strictly speaking, 
since the questionnaire only asks about information on availability of  social insurance in general type 
rather than specific, we cannot guarantee that the pension program adopted by the subjects are China’s 
6 For more detailed information on restriction rules and number of  observation, please see Table A2 in the Appendix. 
 rural pension program. For our restricted sample, however, it is most probably that the pension program 
enrolled by them is the rural pension program. During that period in China, the rural pension program is 
the only pension program available for rural people. The mean participation rate of  the pension 
program in our sample is also very close to the officially reported participation rates of  China’s rural 
pension program.  
Basic descriptive statistics of  selected variables are displayed in Table 1. The first column of  Table 
1 shows a general picture of  the whole sample, while columns two and three disaggregated the sample 
by pension participation status. The significant signs indicate that the characteristic in that row (e.g., 
presence of  sons) is significantly different between the two groups (e.g., pension=1/pension=0). 3.2% 
of  subjects in our final sample participate in pension program. On average, one individual has 1.57 sons 
and 1.43 daughters and the probability of  having at least one son and daughter is 91% and 81%, 
respectively. On average, group without pension have higher probability of  having at least one son, 
larger total number of  sons and daughters, lower education achievements, higher proportion of  
minorities, lower individual income, household income and wealth than group accessing to pension, and 
are more likely to work and younger than group without pension. All differences are statistically 
significant.  
Table 1 
We also use a subsample of  the individual-level data to examine whether accessing to pension 
mitigates old parents’ dependency on their family members. This subsample consists of  individuals who 
are aged from 60-64. Summary statistics of  the subsample are reported in the last three columns of  
Table 1. Column 4 shows a general picture, while columns 5 and 6 disaggregated the sample by pension 
participation status. The comparison between column 5 and column 6 reveals similar pattern as that 
between column 2 and column 3.  
Table 2 
To assess the impact of  accessing to old-age social insurance on sex ratio, we aggregate the sex 
 ratio by age group at the region level and employ the difference-in-differences strategy to examine the 
effects of  the pension program on sex ratio. Sex ratios at birth are particularly high in central China and 
along the south-eastern coast where son preference is known to be intense and where China’s fertility 
regulations are strictly enforced (Gu et al, 2007). The spatial heterogeneity in the sex ratio distortions 
suggests that a region-level analysis of  China’s fertility trends may help to identify the factors underlying 
the increase in the sex ratio at birth. Panel A of  table 2 reports the sex ratio of  different birth cohorts 
calculated at the region level. Column 1 of  Table 2 shows a general picture of  the whole sample, while 
columns two and three disaggregated the sample by the level of  participation rate of  the pension 
program, i.e. high or low. All regions in which average participation rates of  pension program are above 
the mean level of  the whole sample are categorized into the group “high”, otherwise, “low”. It can be 
seen from the first three columns that sex ratios among all regions have largely increased since 1978. 
However, regions with higher participation rates of  pension have lower sex ratios after 1998. Since some 
regions in our sample have very small sampled population size, the calculated sex ratios may be imprecise. 
Therefore, we also conduct a restricted sample, which exclude those regions in which sampled 
population size is smaller than one hundred.7 Sex ratio of  the restricted sample is slightly different from 
the whole sample: sex ratios in regions having higher pension participation rates are slightly higher. The 
comparison between the two groups categorized by the level of  participation rate of  the pension 
program in the restricted sample also shows similar pattern to those in the whole sample. In later 
sections, we use the whole sample to examine the nationwide effect of  the pension program on sex ratio 
at birth, and use the restricted sample to run the same regressions as robustness check. It is worth noting 
that sex ratios calculated in panel A are actually not the sex ratio at birth for each birth cohort since 
mortality rates of  male and female for each birth cohort are probably different. If  we want to obtain sex 
ratio at birth, we need to adjust the mortality rate for each gender across various birth cohorts. In panel 
B we calculate the adjusted sex ratio to obtain sex ratio at birth for each birth cohorts for male and 
female separately. The adjusted sex ratios in each group are slightly different from the unadjusted.            
                                                      
7 This means total population in that region is less than 50 thousands since our data is a 20% sample of  the 1% population sample survey. 
China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study 
 In Sept. 2009, the Chinese government initiates the new rural pension program. By the end of  2010, 
more than 24% rural people have been covered by this program. CHARLS, conducted in 2011, have 
detailed information on social insurance. Using data from CHARLS, we investigate the impact of  
accessing to pension on choices of  old-age support of  rural people to see whether availability of  social 
insurance affects parents demand for children for support in old age. This also can provide us insights 
on potential impact of  this new rural pension program on people’s economic behavior relating to 
old-age support. 
CHARLS is a biennial survey being conducted by the National School of  Development (China 
Center for Economic Research) at Peking University. CHARLS aims to be representative of  the 
residents of  China age 45 and older, with no upper age limit. The sample size of  the baseline survey in 
2011 is around 10,000 households and more than 16,000 individuals. CHARLS is part of  a set of  
longitudinal aging surveys that include surveys in the United State, England, nineteen countries in 
continental Europe, Korea, Japan, and India. CHARLS aims to set up a high quality, nationally 
representative and publicly available micro-database that provides a wide range of  information about the 
households of  the elderly and also individual information on the elderly respondents and their spouses.   
4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1. Effects of  Number and Sex Composition of  Children on Pension Enrollment Decision 
In this section we examine the impact of  number and sex composition of  children on pension 
enrollment decision. We employ two specifications. For the first specification, we estimate the following 
equation: 
pensioni=β0+β1anysonsi+β2children𝑖++β3Xi+ui       (1) 
where pension is a dummy variable indicating whether the subject i participating in the rural pension 
program, anysons is a dummy variable indicating whether having at least one son, children denotes the 
total number of  children. X is a set of  covariates which may also relate to pension enrollment decision. 
 Subscript i denotes observation i, which is defined at the individual level. This specification allowes us to 
isolate the impact of  presence of  sons condition on numbers of  children. 




= β0 + β1sons𝑖 + β2daughters+β3Xi+ui       (2) 
The covariates in equation (1) and equation (2) include age, age square, education level, ethnicity, work 
status, log values of  income, household income and house value.  
Table 3 
We first estimate equation (1) and equation (2) using the whole sample, and then estimate them 
separately for male and female. Estimates from equation (1) are displayed in panel A of  Table 3. Panel B 
displays estimates from equation (2). As shown in column 1, presence of  sons decreases the probability 
of  pension enrollment by 2.12 percentages, while each additional child decreases the probability of  
pension enrollment by 0.93 percentages. The effects are 66% and 29% at the mean level considering the 
mean participation rate of  3.2%. Adding other covariates increases the coefficient of  presence of  sons 
to 0.0221 and leaves the coefficient of  children unchanged. Although we have added individual and 
family observable characteristics, unobservable region characteristics such as the characteristics of  the 
local governments may also affect individual’s enrollment decision and fertility decision simultaneously. 
For instance, implementation of  family planning policy and pension program could be both more 
intensive in some regions because of  higher executive power of  the local governments. Therefore, we 
further use region dummies to capture region fixed effects. Effects of  presence of  sons and number of  
children largely decrease to 0.68 and 0.20 percentages respectively. . Partly as a robustness check, we 
further estimate equation (1) using a restricted sample which excludes regions in which there are no 
insurants8
                                                      
8 Although it is not exactly true, we take regions without insurants as those have not implemented the program.  
. These regions may have not implemented rural pension program and respondents in these 
regions are thus “never takers”. As our anticipation, the effects of  presence of  sons and number of  
 children both change to larger. In this case, controlling for covariates and region fixed effects, presence 
of  sons increases the likelihood of  pension enrollment by 1.05 percentages, while each additional child 
reduce the probability of  participating in the pension program by 0.36 percentages. Our estimates are 
much smaller than that in Ebenstein and Leung (2010), in which total number of  children is missed in 
the model specification and no region fixed effects are controlled.  
From column 5 to column 8, we estimate equation (1) using male subsample. The estimates from 
various model specifications are similar to that using the whole sample, but all with a slightly smaller 
magnitude. This is a mirror of  the estimates obtained from female subsample from column 9 to column 
12, of  which the magnitudes are all slightly larger than that using the whole sample. Considering the 
mean participation rates of  male and female are 3.68% and 2.98% respectively, a larger coefficient for 
female suggests that the impacts of  presence of  sons and number of  children on pension enrollment are 
larger for female than that for male. This difference by gender shows mothers are more sensitive to their 
adult children in old-age support. 
We estimate equation (2) and display the results in panel B of  Table 3. With this specification, we 
treat number of  sons and number of  daughters as continuous variable, and capture the effects of  sons 
and daughters at the same time. Estimates using the whole sample are displayed from column 1 to 
column 4. One additional son decreases the probability of  enrollment by 0.27 percentages. One 
additional daughter decreases the probability of  enrollment by 0.17 percentages, less about one third 
than the effect of  an additional son. In column 2, we add other covariates, the impact of  both son and 
daughter largely increase. Effects of  one additional son and one additional daughter are 0.45 and 0.37, 
respectively. We further include region dummies in the regression, effects of  sons and daughters both 
slightly increase. In column 4, we estimate equation (2) using the restricted sample, effect of  sons 
increase to 0.60, while effect of  daughters decrease to 0.32.  
Estimates from male and female subsample are displayed in the following columns. For the male 
subsample, coefficients of  sons and daughters are -0.0129 and -0.0072, respectively. The coefficients 
increase after adding other covariates but largely decrease after controlling the region fixed effects. 
Estimates using female subsample are larger than male with various model specifications. This is 
 consistent with results from estimating equation (1).  
Figure 4 
In conclusion, the estimation results show that presence of  sons decreases their parents’ likelihood 
of  participating in the pension program. Both additional sons and additional daughters make the parents 
less likely to participate in the pension program. In addition, effect of  additional daughters is smaller 
than effect of  additional sons. These results suggest that lacking children, especially sons increases the 
rural people’s demand for social insurance for support in old age. This is consistent with the traditional 
argument that children, especially sons are viewed as provides of  support in old age by rural people. On 
the other side, these results imply that absence of  social insurance will make children, especially sons 
more necessary to rural people for support in old age. In terms of  providers of  support in old age, sons 
and social insurance can serve as substitutes for each other. Of  course, one should be cautious to 
interpret the effects of  number and sex composition of  children as causal. One concern may be the 
reverse causality, that is, women’s fertility decision may have been affected by availability of  pension 
benefits. This concern, however, does not quite necessary under our specification. We have restricted the 
sample to female aged 50 and older and male whose spouse is 50 and older. All these individuals (or 
their spouse) should have finished their fertility history when they were making decisions in participating 
in the pension program that started in 1992. Figure 4 displays female’s probability of  giving birth by age 
using China’s Census 1990. Female aged from 50 to 64 in 2005 is corresponding to the age cohort from 
35 to 50 in 1990. Women in these age groups in China’s rural areas have nearly finished their fertility 
history. A second concern is that the participation of  pension is affected by whether the program has 
been introduced there; therefore, characteristics of  local governments may simultaneously affect the 
fertility behaviors of  residents and availability of  the pension program. We also eliminate this concern by 
estimating within estimators with region fixed effects controlled. Controlling for region fixed effects 
indeed decreases the impacts of  sons and daughters by a large amount, but the impacts are still 
statistically significant and large. A third concern is that parents who are more likely to participate in 
formal social insurance are also less likely to desire many children and concern about having a son. In 
our regressions, we have controlled a set of  individual characteristics and family characteristics, which 
 may capture the effect of  “preference”. And including these covariates do not change the estimates 
much. Anyway, in next section we directly examine whether accessing to pension decreases rural parents’ 
desire for children as providers of  support in old age. These can provide further evidence to verify our 
interpretation that adult children, especially sons and formal social old age insurance are viewed by 
parents as substitute for each other in providing support in old age. 
4.2. Access to pension and choice of  providers of  support in old age 
In this section we relate accessing to pension and the number and sex composition of  children to 
old age people’s source of  support in old age. We restrict our sample to individuals aged from 60-649
familysupport
𝑖
= β0 + β1pensioni + β2anysons𝑖 + β3children𝑖 + β4X𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 (3) 
, 
summary statistics of  this subsample are listed in the last three columns of  Table 1. Using the 
mini-census data, we examine whether accessing to pension mitigates old parents’ dependency on their 
family members. Specifically, we estimate the following equation 
where familysupport is a binary variable indicating whether the elderly rely on their family members, 
definitions of  other variables are the same to equation (1). Subscript i denotes observation i which is 
defined at the individual level. 




= β0 + β1pensioni + β2sons𝑖 + β3daughters𝑖 + β4X𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 (4) 
Estimation results from equation (3) are reported in Table 4. The baseline regression results in 
column 1 indicate that old parents who are access to pension program are 15.27 percentages (or 67% at 
the mean level, i.e. 0.1527/0.2272) less likely to rely on their family members in the whole sample. 
Presence of  sons increases the probability of  relying on family members by 0.85 percentages, but is 
                                                      
9As we have pointed out above, in the 2005 1% Population Sample Survey, women aged 65 and older have not been asked about 
information on childbearing, thus have no information on number of  children. For simplicity, males are also restricted to those aged from 
60 to 64. We choose age 60 as the cutoff  point to restrict our sample to elderly. 
 insignificant. Each additional child increases the probability of  relying on family members by 1.86 
percentages. Adding other controls largely increases the magnitude of  the coefficient of  presence of  
sons to 0.0354, while coefficient on number of  children decreases to 0.0045; both coefficients are 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Effect of  pension largely increases to 38.1 percentages. Region 
dummies are further included in column 3, estimates do not change much. Accessing to pension 
decreases the probability of  relying on family member by 36.95 percentages, presence of  sons increases 
the probability by 2.78 percentages, and each additional child increases the probability by 0.56; all 
estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level. We then estimate equation (3) using male and female 
subsample separately. There are no large differences between estimates using total sample and subsample. 
What we can see is the estimates on sons and daughters using male subsample are slightly larger than 
estimates using female subsample, while estimate on pension is slightly smaller. These results suggest 
that father is more desiring for social insurance for support in old age than mother.  
We estimate equation (4) and show results in panel B of  table 4. Number of  sons and number of  
daughters are both treated as continuous variable. Estimates on pension are almost the same as that in 
panel A across various model specifications. Including sons and daughters at the same time allows us to 
make a comparison between effect of  sons and daughters. In the baseline regression, having pension 
decreases the probability of  relying on family members by 15.13 percentages, one additional son 
increases the probability of  relying on family member by 2.82 percentages, and one additional daughter 
increases the probability by 1.24 percentages. Effect of  sons are more than doubled than the effect of  
daughters, which suggests the rural people rely more on sons for support in old age. Effect of  pension 
increases to 38.15 after adding other covariates, and effects of  sons and daughters decrease to 0.95 and 
0.40. In our final specification with region dummies, effect of  pension is 37 percentages and the effects 
of  sons and daughters are 0.98 and 0.52 percentages, respectively. Effect of  sons is still about double of  
the effect of  daughters. Estimation results using subsample are displayed in the following six columns. 
We find consistent results with that using the whole sample. Comparison between estimates using male 
and female shows father relies more on social insurance while mother relies more on their children.   
Table 4 
 In conclusion, the estimation results in table 4 suggest that accessing to pension mitigates old 
parents’ dependency on their family members, while additional sons and daughters both increase the 
probability of  relying on family members for old-age support. Moreover, effect of  sons is much larger 
than effect of  daughters. Our estimation results are robust to various model specifications. These results 
are consistent with the hypothesis that formal old age support such as pension program could substitute 
old-age support provided by children, and sons are more valuable than daughters in providing support in 
old age. 
Table 5 
We further confirm these results using CHARLS data. Different from our mini-census data, 
CHARLS asks the respondent the expectation on choice of  support in old age other than the current 
source of  support in old age. This allows us to examine the impact of  accessing to social insurance on 
parents’ intention instead of  ex post status concerning support in old age. Respondents can choose from 
five choices: children, savings, pension or retirement salary, commercial pension insurance and others. 
We firstly describe the choices of  rural respondents in table 5. More than 80% rural people answered 
that children are the provider for support can be relied on in old age. This percent is even larger for 
female, suggesting female relies more on children than male, which is consistent with our previous 
results in Table 4. The second important provider can be relied on is pension or retirement salary. 9.42% 
male and 7.09% female think they can rely on pension or retirement salary. In the following column in 
table 5, we firstly separate the group by whether NRPP is available to the rural people, in other word, 
whether there is NRPP implemented in that community. It is shown that 78.19% respondents choose to 
reply on children if  there is NRPP available and 85.31% if  otherwise. This comparison suggests that 
available to pension mitigates the rural people’s dependency on children for support in old age. As a 
mirror, 10.58% respondents choose to rely on pension or retirement salary if  there is NRPP available, 
and 4.52% if  otherwise. Similar pattern is found for male and female. In the last column, we redefine 
two groups by whether the respondents having enrolled in NRPP. People enrolled are different to people 
to whom NRPP is available to some extent. The former group is somewhat self-selected. People who 
want to rely on social insurance rather than children are more likely to enroll than those who are more 
 desired to rely on children for support in old age. As a result, “enrolled” people as a group is less likely 
to rely on children but more likely to rely on pension than the “available” group. The results are just as 
what we anticipated. 12.57% “enrolled” people choose to rely on pension or retirement salary, while 
10.58% “available” people choose to rely on pension or retirement salary. Comparison between enrolled 
and not enrolled people again shows that accessing to pension mitigates the rural people’s dependency 
on children for support in old age.  
We reexamine the impact of  accessing to NRPP on choice of  old-age support in a regression 
framework that allows us to partial out the effects of  other covariates. In specific, we estimate the 
following equation using CHARLS data,  
childsupport
𝑖
= β0 + β1pensioni + β2sons𝑖 + β3daughters𝑖 + β4X𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 (5) 
the variable childsupport is constructed by categorizing the choices of  support for old age in table 5 into 
two types: children and others. childsupport equals 1 if  the respondents choose to rely on children, equals 
zero otherwise. pension is a dummy indicating whether NRPP is available (or whether the respondents 
enrolled in NRPP). sons and daughters denote number of  sons and number of  daughters. X is a set of  
covariates including age, gender, education level, and marriage status. 
Table 6 
Estimation results are displayed in Table 6. People living in communities where NRPP has been 
implemented are 7.52 percentages less likely to rely on children for support in old age. The effects for 
male and female are 7.17 percentages and 7.83 percentages, respectively. Enrolled people are 3.11 
percentages less likely to rely on children for support in old age. This effect is much smaller than that in 
column 1, which may reflect the “self-selection” of  the insurants as we has discussed in previous section. 
The effects for male and female are 3.32 percentages and 2.84 percentages, respectively. Across various 
model specifications, the effects of  sons and daughters are all positively significant. Moreover, effects of  
sons are always larger than that of  daughters.  
 The evidence shown in Table 5 and Table 6 confirm our argument concluded from Table 4. That is 
accessing to pension lowers the parents’ demand for children for support in old age. We also see that 
sons concern more than daughters as provider of  support in old age.  
So far, we have shown that presence of  sons, additional sons and daughters all significantly 
decrease parents’ pension participation rates, and the impact of  sons is much larger than that of  
daughters. These estimation results suggest that children, especially sons, are important sources of  
support for rural people in old age, and pension program and adult children could be substitutes in 
providing support in old age. We have also directly shown that accessing to pension program decreases 
old parents’ dependency on their family members, which is further reassured by evidence from CHARLS 
data. Overall, the pension program has effective function in providing support in old age for rural 
people. Due to the long lasting family planning policy, the probability of  presence of  sons and number 
of  children in rural households has both largely decreased. Figure 5 plots the probability of  having at 
least one son and number of  children by age. It can be seen that for married women younger than 45, 
who probably give birth after 1980, a large proportion of  them have no sons and number of  children 
drops much. As the support from children declined, the rural family has to seek for alternative support 
in old age now. Without other types of  support, the family would try its best to give birth at least one 
son through various methods such as artificial abortion and drowning of  infants, which consequently 
lead to “missing girls” or sex ratio bias. Our above estimation results imply that lack of  social insurance 
would result in higher demand of  parents for children, especially sons on whom to depend when they 
turn to old. Since parents view sons more valuable than daughters, in other word, have son preference, 
lack of  social insurance combined with fertility restriction would probably lead to sex ratio bias. In other 
words, accessing to social insurance such as rural pension program and NRPP may be helpful in 
mitigating parents’ dependency on children, especially sons and thus correct the sex ratio bias to some 
extent. Ebenstein and Leung (2010) have made a tentative conclusion using data on 95 regions in China. 
They found that the implementation of  rural pension program has a large impact on sex ratio at birth. 
However, as we have discussed in the introduction section, their results suffer from some potential 
problems. In next section, we use a new nationwide dataset and employ the standard 
difference-in-differences strategy to examine whether the implementation of  the rural old age pension 
 program have mitigated the increase of  sex ratio calculated at the region level. 
Figure 5 
4.3. Effects of  Pension Program on Sex Ratio at birth  
The introduction of  the rural pension program in 1992 provides a quasi-natural experiment for us 
to examine the impact of  pension program on sex ratio at birth. We use the difference-in-differences 
(DID) identification strategy as used by Duflo (2001), in which the impact of  one school construction 
program in Indonesia on education attainment and labor market consequences have been examined. Sex 
ratio at birth has increased nationwide before and after the implementation of  the program, i.e. the sex 
ratio at birth after 1998, in which year the program stops to receive new participants, is higher than the 
sex ratio before 1992, in which year the program was introduced nationwide (see Table 2). However, if  
the program indeed has impacts on sex ratio at birth, sex ratio at birth would increase less in regions 
where pension program is more intensively implemented. The difference in these differences can be 
interpreted as the causal effect of  the program, under the assumption that in the absence of  the 
program, the increase of  sex ratio would not have been systematically different among regions with 
different level of  availabilities of  pension. It is possible that the pattern of  increase in sex ratio at birth 
could vary systematically across regions, which may contaminate the DID estimates. However, the 
identification assumption can be tested explicitly here because all birth cohorts before 1992 cannot be 
affected by the program. The increase in sex ratio at birth between cohorts in those birth cohorts should 
not differ systematically across regions. To exploit the variation in treatment density across regions and 
cohorts, the above identification strategy is generalized to a regression framework as follows: 
sexratiojc=β0+β1D_afterc+β2𝑅𝑗+β3D_afterc×pension_highj+ujc  (6) 
where sexratiojc is the sex ratio of  birth cohort c in region j, D_afterc is a dummy indicating whether the 
birth cohorts belongs to the “young” group, i.e. those born after 1998, pension_highj is a dummy indicating 
whether the program’s availability is “high” in region j . “High” level is defined as above the mean 
participation rate in the whole sample. The pension participation rate is calculated as the average 
 participation rate of  the pension program of  residents aged from 27 to 47. Persons belonging to these 
age cohorts are exposed to the pension program, and probably give birth after the stagnation of  the 
program. In other words, people in these age cohorts are those treated by the program, therefore we use 
their pension participation to measure the intensity of  the pension program. Rj is a region fixed effect. 
Then, the coefficient of  the interaction term D_afterc×pension_highj,  i.e. 𝛽3 is the treatment effect of  the 
pension program.  
It is worth noting that the sex ratio we calculated so far is not the actual sex ratio at birth. To obtain 
sex ratio at birth we need to adjust the mortality rates of  male and female in various birth cohorts. More 
important, if  the mortality rate of  male and female vary for various age groups comparing sex ratio 
between older groups and younger groups would not capture the exact change of  sex ratio at birth. It is 
widely discussed that due to son preference mortality rate of  girls are higher than boys. In this case, sex 
ratio of  older birth cohorts will be higher than their sex ratio at birth. Our estimates will be biased. 
However, in this case, the difference in mortality rate between girls and boys is also result of  son 
preference. If  accessing to pension does mitigate son preferences, mortality rate of  girls will be more 
close to mortality rate of  boy and thus results in lower sex ratio. Without adjusted sex ratio, our 
estimates may capture the potential effect on mortality rate. We are both interested in the impact on sex 
ratio birth and the final resulted sex ratio, thus we first estimate equation (6) using the unadjusted sex 
ratio and then estimate using the sex ratio after adjusting gender specific mortality rates of  each birth 
cohort.   
Table 7 
Results from estimating equation (6) are reported in column 1 of  Table 7. The suggested effect is 
that high pension availability decreases the sex ratio by about 15.7. Considering the sex ratio at birth in 
2005 is as high as 119, a large effect as such could changes the sex ratio to a normal level, i.e. 103. Since 
some of  the regions are too small in population size to calculate precise sex ratio, our calculations of  sex 
ratio may be too noisy. As a robustness theck, we restrict sample to regions in which the sampled 
 population size is larger than one hundred.10
To eliminate the confounding effect of  mortality rates by age group, we regress equation (6) using 
the adjusted sex ratio, which can be viewed as sex ratio at birth. We obtain an estimate as large as -13.108 
using the total sample. This estimate is smaller than the unadjusted result. Estimated effect using the 
restricted sample in column 7 is -11.927, only slightly larger than the unadjusted effect. Whether adjust 
the mortality rate or not doesn't make a large difference. These estimation results from equation (6) 
suggest a large effect of  accessing to pension on sex ratio at birth.  
  Estimator using restricted sample is -11.621 as shown in 
column 3. This effect is smaller in magnitude than that using unrestricted sample, but we view this as a 
more robust result. 
Now we turn to an alternative specification. Instead of  compressing the intensity of  the program 
into a dummy indicating high level or low, we examine the intensity of  the program in a continuous 
manner. Specifically, we estimate the following equation 
sexratiojc=β0+β1D_afterc+β2Rj+β3D_afterc×pensionj+ujc     (7) 
where pensionj is a continuous variable that denotes the average participation rate of  the pension program 
of  residents aged from 27 to 47 in region j.11
As shown in column 2 of  Table 7, one percentage point higher pension participation rate decreases 
the sex ratio by about 0.65. Since the average participation rate of  the pension program is 3.2%, the total 
nationwide effect of  the pension program is as high as 2.1, only a moderate effect though it is 
statistically significant at 1% level. Estimate of  equation (7) using the restricted sample is reported in 
column (4), which is as high as 0.42. This effect is one third less than that using the total sample, but is 
still statistically significant at the 5% level. Our adjusted results using total sample and restricted sample 
are -0.598 and -0.408, respectively. Either is smaller than the unadjusted ones. Our estimates by 
regressing equation (7) suggest a nationwide effect of  the rural pension program ranges from 1.3 to 2.1. 
 All other specifications are the same to equation (6). 
                                                      
10 This means that the total population of  the region is more than two hundred thousand, since our dataset is a 1/5 random draw of  the 
2005 1% sample survey.  
11 Unit of  pension is %.  
 This is much smaller than the effect estimated by Ebenstein and Leung (2010). The effect of  rural 
pension program estimated by Ebenstein and Leung (2010) is more than 10 using OLS. Their 
instrumental estimate is even ten times larger, which does not make sense. Their model specification 
overestimates the effect of  the rural pension program on sex ratio. But our results are consistent with 
Ebenstein and Leung (2010) in the aspect that implementation of  the rural program significantly 
lowered the sex ratio at birth.   
Whether our DID estimates are consistent rely on the assumption that in the absence of  the 
pension program, the increase of  sex ratio would not have been systematically different among regions 
with different level of  availabilities of  pension. We explicitly test this assumption by conducting a 
falsification experiment. We compare the sex ratio between birth cohorts 1985~1991 and birth cohorts 
1978~1984. If  the growth patterns of  sex ratio between the control group and treatment group are not 
systematically different from each other, we should not see a significant difference in the changes of  sex 
ratio between the two groups. On the other hand, if  before the introduction of  the pension program, 
increase trend of  sex ratio at birth is systematically different among regions, for instance, sex ratio at 
birth increases faster (or slower) in those regions in which the program is more intensively implemented, 
then the implementation of  the program would show significant impact on sex ratio at birth. However, 
the impact of  the “program” is very small and never significant across various specifications as shown in 
panel B of  Table 7. Although it is not definitive evidence, it is reassuring. 
5. Conclusions 
In this article, using China’s 2005 mini-census data, we show that parents who have at least one son 
are associated with higher pension participation rate. The total number of  sons and daughters are both 
negatively related to parents’ participation rate, especially for the number of  sons. We also find parents 
who access to pension are less likely to rely on their family members, which are further confirmed by 
evidence from CHARLS. Our empirical results consistently suggest that pension and children, especially 
sons both can provide old age support for elderly and can partly substitute for each other. Moreover, 
exploiting the difference-in-differences strategy, we find that the implementation of  the rural pension 
program has significantly decreased the sex ratio at birth, although with only moderate magnitudes 
 ranging from 1.3 to 2.1.  
These two related pieces of  evidence established in this paper lead to insights that one of  the 
causes of  sex ratio bias since 1980s in China is the lack of  social insurance in China’s rural area. 
Worrying about their support in old age, peasants have strong desire for children, especially sons. Since 
total number of  birth is restricted by the family planning policy, peasants could not have as many 
children as they desire, therefore they have even stronger desire to have sons since sons are more 
valuable than daughters in providing support in old age. They have either the incentives or the 
capabilities to use various methods such as sex-selective induced abortion to achieve their desire. It is 
well accepted that serious sex ratio bias will have large negative impacts on the Chinese society (Edlund 
et al, 2007; Ebenstein and Jennings, 2008). Conclusions of  this paper suggest that implementation of  
social old age support systems in rural China could be helpful in correcting sex ratio bias. We 
acknowledge that the impact of  social old age support systems may not be large enough to turn the sex 
ratio at birth to normal level, considering the moderate impact of  the rural pension program. Although 
son’s role in providing support in old age has been widely emphasized (Das Gupta et al. 2003; 
Greenhalgh and Winckler 2005), desiring for sons is also rooted in other reasons. First, under China’s 
traditional patrilineal family system sons are expected to continue their family lines. Second, family 
wealth including land tenure is customarily inherited by sons rather than daughters. Finally, sons have 
better labor outcomes than daughters, and therefore are more likely to bring benefits to parents (Qian, 
2008). Significantly decline of  son preference and thus the decline of  sex ratio may need normative 
change within the society as a whole, as what has been happened in South Korea (Chung and Das Gupta, 
2007), or reconsideration and redesign of  the family planning policy, as proposed by Zeng (2007).   
Our paper also provides first piece of  insights on the potential impacts of  new rural pension 
program on rural people’s socioeconomic behaviors. The Chinese government initiated the NRPP in 
Sept. 2009 (State Council, 2009). By the end of  2010, there was a coverage rate of  24% of  NRPP. In the 
work discussion meeting on rural social insurance held in Dec. 2011, the vice Minister Hu Xiaoyi said 
NRPP would cover all rural areas by the end of  2012, eight years earlier than originally planned. The old 
rural pension program is the Chinese government’s first attempt to established social old-age insurance 
 system in rural areas, but it failed after a short term of  rapid expansion. The new rural pension program 
is much more ambitious than the old one, whether it will succeed and whether the socioeconomic 
conditions required have been well prepared are all still ambiguous. However, one thing is definitive, that 
is this pension program will affect the socioeconomic behavior of  the rural people from various aspects. 
Using a newly conducted household survey in China, we have shown that the implementation of  this 
new rural pension program affects the choice of  older rural people for providers of  support in old age. 
Our analysis on the old rural pension program also implies that this new pension program will probably 
affect rural people’s fertility behavior and thus be helpful in correcting sex ratio bias. Hopefully, similar 
analysis in this paper can be done in future by estimating the impact of  NRPP on rural people’s fertility 
behaviors once qualified data are available.   
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Figure 1 Sex Ratio at Birth: 1981~2008
Source: Handbook of Population and Family Planning Data , pp. 130, edited by National
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Figure 2  Coverage of Rural Old-age Pension Program
Source: Data before 1998 come from Statistic Communiques of the Ministry of Civil Affairs,
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Presence of Sons Number of Children
Total Pension=1 Pension=0 Total Pension=1 Pension=0
Pension 0.032
(0.177)
Presence of sons 0.910 0.831 0.913*** 0.929 0.876 0.931***
(0.286) (0.375) (0.282) (0.257) (0.329) (0.253)
Presence of daughters 0.809 0.759 0.810*** 0.846 0.808 0.847***
(0.393) (0.428) (0.392) (0.361) (0.394) (0.360)
Number of sons 1.574 1.255 1.584*** 1.865 1.531 1.877***
(0.951) (0.868) (0.952) (1.075) (0.969) (1.077)
Number of daughters 1.433 1.218 1.440*** 1.688 1.465 1.696***
(1.108) (1.017) (1.110) (1.222) (1.163) (1.223)
Age 56.219 56.544 56.208*** 62.822 62.949 62.817***
(4.800) (4.951) (4.794) (2.794) (2.873) (2.791)
Male 0.376 0.426 0.374*** 0.513 0.575 0.511***
(0.484) (0.495) (0.484) (0.500) (0.495) (0.500)
Literacy 0.244 0.134 0.248*** 0.316 0.188 0.321***
(0.430) (0.341) (0.432) (0.465) (0.391) (0.467)
Elementary school 0.546 0.512 0.547*** 0.524 0.488 0.525***
(0.498) (0.500) (0.498) (0.500) (0.500) (0.499)
Middle school 0.186 0.293 0.182*** 0.142 0.263 0.138***
(0.389) (0.455) (0.386) (0.349) (0.440) (0.345)
High school or above 0.025 0.061 0.023*** 0.018 0.062 0.017***
(0.155) (0.240) (0.151) (0.134) (0.240) (0.128)
Minority 0.100 0.042 0.102*** 0.106 0.040 0.109***
(0.300) (0.200) (0.302) (0.308) (0.196) (0.311)
Income 2.684 2.968 2.674*** 1.991 1.592 2.006***
(3.282) (5.270) (3.194) (2.817) (3.460) (2.789)
Household Income 5.060 5.958 5.030*** 3.561 3.075 3.579***
(5.383) (8.685) (5.234) (4.471) (5.132) (4.443)
House Value 0.268 0.495 0.261*** 0.237 0.437 0.229***
(0.685) (0.749) (0.682) (0.784) (0.834) (0.782)
At work 0.809 0.734 0.811*** 0.628 0.366 0.7533***
(0.393) (0.442) (0.391) (0.484) (0.482) (0.431)
Living rely on family support 0.227 0.192 0.228*** 0.337 0.179 0.343***
(0.419) (0.394) (0.420) (0.473) (0.383) (0.475)
Observations 181080 5874 175206 45910 1657 44253
Table 1 Sample Averages of the 2005 1% Population Sample Survey: Individual Level
Notes: Collective households are excluded. Sample consists of household head and spouse of household head,
excluding those female younger than 50 and male whose spouse is younger than 50. Income and Household Income
are measured in thousand yuan, while House Value is measured in one hundred thousand yuan. Standard deviations
in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Total Subsample: Age>=60
Source: China's 2005 1% Population Sample Survey: Rural subsample.
Total High Low Total High Low
Sex ratio: Birth cohort 1999 to 2005 122.4 114.6 124.0*** 124.0 115.7 125.5***
(64.8) (77.9) (61.8) (58.6) (59.8) (58.2)
Sex ratio: Birth cohort 1985 to 1991 109.8 112.3 109.4*** 109.0 110.5 108.7***
(51.7) (62.7) (49.2) (41.8) (53.6) (39.3)
Sex ratio: Birth cohort 1978 to 1984 93.9 95.2 94.2*** 94.5 96.7 94.1***
(49.5) (65.7) (45.4) (41.7) (58.6) (37.9)
Observations 2757 458 2299 2430 372 2058
Sex ratio: Birth cohort 1999 to 2005 123.0 115.2 124.7*** 124.6 116.3 126.1***
(65.1) (78.3) (62.1) (58.9) (60.1) (58.5)
Sex ratio: Birth cohort 1985 to 1991 109.9 112.4 109.5*** 109.1 110.7 108.8***
(51.8) (62.9) (49.3) (41.8) (53.7) (39.3)
Sex ratio: Birth cohort 1978 to 1984 93.4 94.6 93.7*** 94.0 96.2 93.6***
(49.2) (65.3) (45.1) (41.5) (58.2) (37.7)
Observations 2757 458 2299 2430 372 2058
Table 2 Sex Ratio Calculated at the Regional Level by Pension Enrollment Rate.
Source: China's 2005 1% Population Sample Survey: Rural subsample.
Total Restricted sample
Notes: All regions in which average participation rates of pension program are above the mean level of the sample are
categorized into the group “high”, otherwise, low. Restricted sample exclude regions in which the sampled population size is
smaller than one hundred. Standard deviations in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Mortality rate adjusted
Unadjusted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Presence of sons -0.0212*** -0.0221*** -0.0068*** -0.0105*** -0.0209*** -0.0220*** -0.0063** -0.0097** -0.0214*** -0.0221*** -0.0072*** -0.0111***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Number of children -0.0093*** -0.0093*** -0.0020*** -0.0036*** -0.0084*** -0.0090*** -0.0015*** -0.0026*** -0.0099*** -0.0096*** -0.0021*** -0.0038***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Observations 181080 181080 181080 107399 68023 68023 68023 40068 113057 113057 113057 67331
R-squared 0.007 0.024 0.312 0.300 0.005 0.025 0.280 0.268 0.008 0.023 0.356 0.345
Number of sons -0.0027*** -0.0045*** -0.0053*** -0.0060*** -0.0129*** -0.0138*** -0.0032*** -0.0054*** -0.0140*** -0.0138*** -0.0033*** -0.0060***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Number of daughters -0.0017*** -0.0037*** -0.0039*** -0.0032*** -0.0072*** -0.0079*** -0.0011* -0.0018* -0.0090*** -0.0090*** -0.0020*** -0.0036***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Observations 181080 181080 181080 107399 68023 68023 68023 40068 113057 113057 113057 67331
R-squared 0.006 0.023 0.312 0.300 0.005 0.025 0.280 0.268 0.007 0.022 0.356 0.344
Controls No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
County dummy No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Restricted sample No No No Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes
Panel A: Specification I
Table 3 Relationship between Children Sex Composition and Pension Enrollment
Dependent Variable: Participation in Pension Program
Total Male Female
Source: China's 1% Population Sample Survey: Rural subsample.
Notes: Collective households are excluded. Sample consists of household head and spouse of household head, excluding those female younger than 50 and male whose spouse is younger than
50. Controls included age, age squared, education level, ethnicity, work status, log(Income), log(Household Income) and log(House Value). Restricted sample excludes counties having no
insurants. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Panel B: Specification II
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Pension -0.1527*** -0.3810*** -0.3695*** -0.1334*** -0.3783*** -0.3756*** -0.1508*** -0.3647*** -0.3045***
(0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.010) (0.015) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.021)
Presence of sons 0.0085 0.0354*** 0.0278*** -0.0072 0.0235*** 0.0173*** 0.0340** 0.0481*** 0.0408***
(0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.007) (0.006) (0.014) (0.008) (0.007)
Number of children 0.0186*** 0.0045*** 0.0056*** 0.0169*** 0.0038*** 0.0050*** 0.0116*** 0.0049*** 0.0054***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Average probability
Observations 45910 45910 45910 23567 23567 23567 22343 22343 22343
R-squared 0.008 0.789 0.820 0.008 0.738 0.787 0.005 0.815 0.853
Pension -0.1513*** -0.3815*** -0.3700*** -0.1312*** -0.3784*** -0.3758*** -0.1505*** -0.3656*** -0.3057***
(0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.010) (0.015) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.021)
Number of sons 0.0282*** 0.0096*** 0.0098*** 0.0275*** 0.0083*** 0.0082*** 0.0200*** 0.0110*** 0.0113***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
Number of daughters 0.0124*** 0.0040*** 0.0052*** 0.0088*** 0.0027** 0.0044*** 0.0085*** 0.0048*** 0.0049***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Average probability
Observations 45910 45910 45910 23567 23567 23567 22343 22343 22343
R-squared 0.008 0.789 0.820 0.009 0.738 0.787 0.005 0.814 0.853
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
County dummy No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Table 4 Access to Pension and Living Dependency of the Elderly
Panel A: Specification I
Panel B: Specification II
Dependent Variable: Living Rely on Family Support (=1, yes)
Source: China's 1% Population Sample Survey: Rural subsample & aged 60-64.
Notes:  Controls included age,  age squared, education level, ethnicity, log(Income), log(Household Income) and log(House Value). Robust standard
errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Total Male Female
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
Total
Children 10,240 81.01 5,971 78.19 4,269 85.31 2,672 78.08 7,520 82.13
Savings 535 4.23 343 4.49 192 3.84 161 4.7 370 4.04
Pension or retirement salary 1,034 8.18 808 10.58 226 4.52 430 12.57 598 6.53
Commerical pension insurance 51 0.4 17 0.22 34 0.68 4 0.12 47 0.51
Other 781 6.18 498 6.52 283 5.66 155 4.53 621 6.78
Male
Children 4628 78.11 2,670 75.25 1958 82.37 1,207 76.54 3403 78.65
Savings 286 4.83 176 4.96 110 4.63 81 5.14 204 4.71
Pension or retirement salary 558 9.42 432 12.18 126 5.3 213 13.51 344 7.95
Commerical pension insurance 32 0.54 11 0.31 21 0.88 3 0.19 29 0.67
Other 421 7.11 259 7.3 162 6.82 73 4.63 347 8.02
Female
Children 5,603 83.58 3,293 80.73 2,310 88 1,461 79.4 4,112 85.28
Savings 247 3.68 166 4.07 81 3.09 80 4.35 164 3.4
Pension or retirement salary 475 7.09 375 9.19 100 3.81 216 11.74 254 5.27
Commerical pension insurance 19 0.28 6 0.15 13 0.5 1 0.05 18 0.37
Other 360 5.37 239 5.86 121 4.61 82 4.46 274 5.68
Table 5 Access to New Rural Pension and Choice of Old-age Support
Source:  CHARSL, 2011
Notes:  Sample is restricted to rural residents. Available and Not Available are defined as whether the respondent can enroll NRPP if he/she
wants.
Total Available Not Available Enrolled Not EnrolledWhat do you think you can
rely on for old-age support
Total Male Female Total Male Female
Available (=1, yes) -0.0752*** -0.0717*** -0.0783***
(0.007) (0.011) (0.009)
Enrolled (=1, yes) -0.0311*** -0.0284* -0.0332**
(0.010) (0.015) (0.013)
Sons 0.0412*** 0.0450*** 0.0348*** 0.0440*** 0.0407*** 0.0436***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.007)
Daughters 0.0168*** 0.0211*** 0.0102** 0.0129*** 0.0143** 0.0084
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006)
Age -0.0014*** -0.0006 -0.0021*** -0.0011* 0.0006 -0.0025***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Female 0.0221*** 0.0112
(0.008) (0.011)
Capable of reading & writing -0.0305*** -0.0031 -0.0400*** -0.0280** 0.0029 -0.0334*
(0.011) (0.018) (0.013) (0.014) (0.025) (0.018)
Primary school -0.0185* 0.0230 -0.0473*** -0.0242* 0.0396* -0.0756***
(0.010) (0.017) (0.014) (0.014) (0.023) (0.020)
Middle school or above -0.0359*** 0.0068 -0.0680*** -0.0257* 0.0312 -0.0637***
(0.011) (0.018) (0.015) (0.015) (0.025) (0.022)
Divorce/Separated -0.3817*** -0.4358*** -0.0276 -0.3848*** -0.4443*** 0.0327
(0.029) (0.031) (0.065) (0.039) (0.041) (0.088)
Widowed 0.0686*** 0.0398** 0.0899*** 0.0689*** 0.0276 0.0956***
(0.011) (0.020) (0.013) (0.015) (0.029) (0.017)
Migrates -0.0511 -0.0083 -0.0840* -0.0289 -0.0098 -0.0395
(0.035) (0.048) (0.049) (0.043) (0.063) (0.059)
Constant 0.8428*** 0.7533*** 0.9312*** 0.7821*** 0.6449*** 0.8908***
(0.029) (0.045) (0.035) (0.039) (0.062) (0.046)
Observations 12587 6032 6555 7165 3378 3787
R-squared 0.049 0.066 0.030 0.041 0.061 0.028
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample is restricted to rural residents.
Dependent Variable: Rely on Children for Old-age Support (=1, yes)
Table 6  Access to New Rural Pension and Choice of Old-age Support
Source:  CHARLS, 2011
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Specification I -15.711*** -11.621** -13.108*** -11.927***
(5.207) (4.541) (4.942) (4.181)
Specification II -0.653*** -0.418** -0.598*** -0.408**
(0.235) (0.210) (0.198) (0.189)
Observations 5273 5273 4856 4856 5270 5270 4854 4854
R-squared 0.549 0.549 0.534 0.533 0.554 0.555 0.541 0.540
Specification I 2.113 -0.138 1.558 -0.784
(5.009) (4.301) (4.670) (4.216)
Specification II 0.123 0.066 0.005 -0.014
(0.194) (0.161) (0.206) (0.163)
Observations 5327 5327 4860 4860 5319 5319 4858 4858
R-squared 0.547 0.547 0.534 0.534 0.556 0.556 0.544 0.544
Total Restricted Sample
Source: China's 2005 1% Population Sample Survey: Rural subsample.
Notes:  Restricted sample excluded counties in which the sampled population size is smaller than one hundred. Robust
standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Unadjusted Mortality Rate Adjusted
Panel A: Experiment of Interest: Birth cohorts 1999 to 2005 or 1985 to 1991
Panel B: Control Experiment: Birth cohorts 1978 to 1991
Total Restricted Sample
Table 7 Effects of Pension Program on Sex Ratio: DID Estimation Results
(Youngest cohort: 1999 to 2005)
(Youngest cohort: 1985 to 1991)
Type of Work Units Participation Rate Frequency
Governments and Institutions 0.331 955
State-owned Enterprises 0.301 365
Collective Enterprises 0.284 756
Private Enterprises 0.183 3331
Other types 0.053 5551
Individual Business 0.069 6869
Operators of Land Contract 0.020 123844
Not at Work 0.037 32162
Total 0.038 186487
Table A1 Pension Participation by Types of Work Unit
Source:  China's 2005 1% Population Sample Survey: Rural subsample.
Notes: Sample has been restricted by age, the total number of observations is corresponding to that in the fifth
row of appendix Table 2.
Table A2 Sample Restriction
Data Number Excluded Number Remaining
Total 1801001
Restricted to household head or spouse of household head 890935 910066
Restricted to female aged from 50 to 65 and male whose spouse aged from 50 to 65 723509 186557
Excluded if information on number of children is missing 60 186497
Excluded if information on pension status is missing 10 186487
Excluded if work at governments and institutions and formal enterprises* 5407 181080
Notes: *Formal enterprises include state-owned enterprises, collective enterprises and private enterprises.
